COMMENTS
APPLICABILITY OF THE IMMUNITY OF
SECTION 7a (10) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT TO
REPRESENTATIVES OF A CORPORATE
BANKRUPT
AMONG the devices arrayed by the Bankruptcy Act to yield that
quantum of information which is indispensable to the administration of

a bankrupt estate are examinations of the bankrupt and other persons.
Section 7a(ro)2 and section 2ia,5 couched in terms so broad as to license
virtually any inquiry which may assist the court in administering the
estate of the bankrupt,4 contain the major provisions for examination.
Attendance at and conduct in the specified examinations are subject to
regulation by way of power to punish for contempt. 5
Militating against full disclosure, however, is the well-established
right of the bankrupt or other persons subject to examination under the
Act to claim the protection of the fifth amendment against self-incrimination.8 But in so far as the bankrupt is concerned, refusal to answer
a material question on the ground of self-incrimination will constitute
130

Stat. 544, as amended (1898);

11 U.S.C.

§§

1-1103, as amended (946).

' "The bankrupt shall ...
(io) at the first meeting of his creditors, at the hearing
upon objections, if any, to his discharge and at such other times as the court shall
order, submit to an examination concerning the conducting of his business, the cause

of his bankruptcy, his dealings with his creditors and other persons, the amount, kind,
and whereabouts of his property, and, in addition, all matters which may affect the
administration and settlement of his estate or the granting of his discharge. .... "
3 "The court may, upon application of any officer, bankrupt, or creditor, by order
require any designated persons, including the bankrupt and his or her spouse, to appear
before the court or before the judge of any State court, to be examined concerning the
acts, conduct, or property of a bankrupt .... "
"See x COLLIER, BANKRUPTCy
7-15-7-23 (14th ed., Moore, 1945) (hereinafter
cited as COLLIER); 2id.

2a.Os-z.3.

'Section 2a(13) of the Act empowers the bankruptcy courts "to enforce obedience
by persons to all lawful orders, by fine or imprisonment or fine and imprisonment." Section 41 affords sanctioning power for contempts before referees.
8 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S.
75 (1920); Matter of Hooks Srelting Co., 138 Fed. 954 (E.D. Pa. 19o5). In general
as to the extent of the privilege against self-incrimination, see x COLLIER 7.21; 2 id.
21.14i 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §§ 2004-2006 (Sth ed., Henderson, x955) (hereinafter cited as REMINcToN); 9 id. §§ 3512-15.

Vol. 1959: 6o8]

BA'NKRUPTCY ACT

6o9

the basis for denial of discharge under section i4c(6) ;7 and this subtle
sanction may well persuade the individual bankrupt to forego assertion
of his constitutional privilege. Moreover, a clause within section 7a(IO),
itself, inevitably will reinforce any inclination to maximum disclosure.
It is there provided:
[N] o testimony given by [the bankrupt] shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding, except such testimony as may be given by him in the hearing upon objections to
his discharge....
As a practical matter, however, the scope of the immunity thus conferred by the Act is not so broad as might appear.' No bar is posed to
a subsequent criminal prosecution; the immunity applies only to the use
of certain material in such a prosecution. The protection is accorded
only to the oral testimony9 of the bankrupt, uttered in an examination
which he was compelled to attend, 10 and although the immunity is
seemingly recognized in state as well as federal courts,'1 it has no application in civil proceedings. Expressly, there is, of course, no immunity
accorded testimony given at the hearing upon objections to discharge,
and a broad exception to the immunity rule is recognized in criminal
actions for perjury or contempt, where the very words of the bankrupt
must be proved in order to sustain the charge against him. 2 Furthermore, the bankrupt's privilege under section 7a(io) may be waived and
is waived by failure to make apt and timely assertion of it."
Despite the eroding effect of the foreging exceptions and limitations,
the scope of the 7a(io) immunity is substantial, and it has occasioned a
considerable amount of litigation-litigation which has left at least one
significant question without definitive answer: Is the testimony of directors, stockholders, officers, or members of a bankrupt corporation
7

Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 21o (4 th Cir. 949) 5 In re Dresser, 146 Fed. 383

(2d Cir. 19o6).

'See I COLLIER 7.21i 9 REMINGTON §§ 3506-Ii.
0 Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592 (1913).
20 Ibid. Cf. White v. United States, 3o F.2d 59o (1st Cir.

1929) ;

Goldstein v.

United States, ii F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1926).
" See cases cited at I COLLIER 7.21 n. 25. But cf. In re Nachman, 114 Fed. 995

(D.S.C.

1902).

"' Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710 (914); Glickstein v. United States,
222 U.S. 139 (1g1); In re Kaplan, 213 Fed. 753 (3 d Cir.), cert. denied, 234 U.S.
765 (x194). But cf. United States v. Weissman, 219 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. z955).
"'Bain v. United States, 262 Fed. 664 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 252 U.S. 586 (1920).
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privileged, whether adduced either under section 7 or section 2 ia examinations?
SECTION

7a

EXAMINATIONS

Of relevance in defining the immunity attaching to testimony elicited
in the course of examinations conducted under section 7a is section 7b,
added to the Act in I938,4 which provides that in a case where the
bankrupt is a corporation, the duties imposed upon it shall be performed
by officers, directors, stockholders, or members thereof as designated by
the court.'" Evidently this section was enacted merely to codify what
had, of necessity, been the previous practice.1 6
It is probably accurate to say that prior to the enactment of section
7b, the weight of authority was to the effect that the immunity accorded
the bankrupt's testimony could not be claimed by the representative of
a corporate bankrupt.1 Indeed, immediately following the addition of
section 7b a dictum' reaffirmed this pre-existing law. Dictum in a more
recent decision' by the same court, however, indicates that a sole share"52 Stat. 848 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 2s(b) (,946).
"It

is generally held that persons withdrawing from such positions prior to the

bankruptcy proceeding can be examined only under § 2xa. E.g., In re Bush Terminal
Co., zo2 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1939). But see Greene v. Harris, 240 F.zd 275 , 276
(2d Cir. 1957), where a gaping loophole is closed by this language: "Nothing in [§ 7 b]
or its background suggests that it should be construed so narrowly as to allow evasion
of its salutary purposes by the patent device of resignation just prior to bankruptcy."
"In re Alphin & Lake Cotton Co., 13z Fed. 824 (E.D. Ark. 1904).

x COLLIER

17.25; 5 REMINGTON § 1983.
"In People v. Lay, 193 Mich. 17, 159 N.W. 299 (1916), it was held that such
testimony is privileged and should be if the purposes of the Act are to be subserved.
Dictum of In re Alphin & Lake Cotton Co., 131 Fed. 825, 826 (E.D. Ark. 1904), indicates a similar conclusion: "[The testimony of officers of a bankrupt corporation] taken
under section 7 or 2 . . . was dearly admissible in any proceeding against them,
other than criminal, as admissions against themselves." (Emphasis added.) Cf. Clark
v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 So. 135 (xi'4). In Kaplan v. United States, 7 F.ad 594 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925), however, the position was taken that the
representatives of a bankrupt corporation are not protected under the immunity clause.
This conclusion was fortified when, in Kolbrenner v. United States, zx F.zd 754, 756
(Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1926), the rule of People v. Lay was expressly
rejected.
3
" In re Bush Terminal Co., 102 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1939): "Section 7 deals with
the duties of bankrupts and, while corporate bankrupts must act in the performance of
those duties by representatives having authority to perform them for such bankrupts,
it does not follow that even those who do act for the bankrupt are to be treated as the
bankrupt. For instance, they are not protected under Sec. 7(9) [the predecessor of

§

7a(Io)]."
1

United States v. Weissman,

219 F.2d 837,

841 (2d Cir. x955).
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holder designated by a court pursuant to section 7b to perform the duties
of the bankrupt corporation can claim the privilege of section 7a(io).
Moreover, this same dictum would seem to imply that the different
rule should obtain just by reason of the enactment of section 7b.20 Thus,
although it would be difficult exactly to define the state of the law on
this point today, some judicial support can be found for the proposition
that representatives of corporate bankrupts examined under section 7
should be entitled to claim the immunity of section 7a(io)i and most
commentators appear to support this view.2 ' Indeed, a literal interpretation of section 7, taken as a whole, would seem reasonably to indicate
that a director or other represenative of a corporate bankrupt acting
pursuant to section 7b is assimilated to the bankrupt in so far as all the
provisions of section 7 are concerned.
But what was the legislative intent?
It seems clear that the underlying purpose of Congress originally was
to conduce the thorough and equitable administration of the bankrupt
estate, which purpose squarely depends for fulfillment upon encouraging
disclosure of a maximum of information relative to the bankrupt's property and his business affairs.22 Any possible doubt that this was the
dominant congressional purpose was dispelled by the enactment in
193823 of the proviso that no immunity can be claimed for testimony
received at the hearing upon objections to discharge in bankruptcy.
Although the bankrupt must appear at such a hearing if he hopes to be
discharged, no similar public purpose would be served by extending immunity to testimony therein elicited i only private interests, personal to
the bankrupt, would be thereby advanced. In a real sense, the burden
of disproving disparaging allegations is upon the bankrupt. Therefore,
only disclosures of a self-serving nature can affect the outcome of this
hearing.
0

oIbid. The Second Circuit also decided Kaplan v. United States, 7 F.2d 594 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (2975),
and In re Bush Terminal Co., 102 F.2d 471
(2d Cir. 1939).
In United States v. Weissman, the court distinguished In re Bush
Terminal Co. on the ground that the latter case had not involved anyone designated
by the court to perform the bankrupt's duties. No reference was made to Kaplan v.
United States, evidently because it had been decided prior to enactment of section 7b.
2"E.g., COLLR
7.21 n. 27; REMINGTON § zoo8; Note, 29 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
259, 264 (954),
reprinted in 28 REF. J. 132 (1954).
22People v. Lay, 193 Mich. 17, 30, 159 N.W. 299, 303 (19x6);
United States v.
Veissman, 219 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1955).
's52
Stat. 847 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 25(10) (1946).
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Thus, it would appear that disclosure aiding administration, not compassion for a bankrupt who is compelled to testify, was the pivotal consideration in the creation of the bankrupt's immunity. Yet, the question
must immediately occur: If fullest disclosure be the dominant purpose of
the section 7 privilege, would not this end be best served by according a
similar privilege to the testimony of every witness? Presumably so,
but it seems reasonable to assume that the bankrupt was singled out, as
a practical matter, 4 because he would ordinarily be supposed to know
more concerning his own business affairs than anyone else.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it seems dear that the designated representative of a corporate bankrupt testifying under section 7a
of the Act should be accorded the same immunity as would be accorded
an individual bankrupt. There is compulsion to testify under pain of
an action for contempt, 25 and this representative is, after all, an equivalent reservoir of information pertaining to the bankrupt's property and
business affairs. Thus, the corporate bankrupt's representative is presumably that person most likely possessed of the kind of information
which must be disclosed if the bankrupt estate is effectively to be administered. Indeed, as a practical matter, the privilege of 7a(io) is perhaps
more necessary to furtherance of the public interest if a corporate representative is undergoing examination than if an individual bankrupt is
being examined. In the latter case, the possibility of denial of discharge for failure to respond to material questions will ordinarily, of
itself, militate in favor of disclosure.
Matters of conscience aside, discharge of his corporate principal following adjudication is not of consequence to the typical corporate representative.
An argument could cenceivably be made that, at least to some extent,
the immunity conferred by section 7 reflects legislative solicitude for
the bankrupt. That is, the bankrupt might otherwise be in the awkward
position of having to choose between waiver of the protection of the
fifth amendment and forfeiture of the privilege of discharge. There is
language in the committee reports possibly lending support to such a
rationialization,2 7 which, indeed, would explain why the bankrupt was
"But see Note, 28 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 259, 265 (1954), where it is suggested that
every5 witness examined should be entitled to the same degree of protection.
" See note 5 supra.
16

See note 7 supra.

"It has been considered wise to exclude from the immunity of the testimony of the
bankrupt that testimony which he gives upon his discharge proceeding. If he refuses to
answer at the discharge hearing a material question upon the ground that it might
'
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singled out to benefit from the immunity. Even were this deemed a
significant consideration in the creation of the 7a(io) protection, however, it should accrue equally to the benefit of the representative of a
corporate bankrupt, at least in those cases which appear to fall into that
ill-defined area where conduct of the corporate representative might
affect the possibility of his securing a discharge in any subsequent personal bankruptcy proceeding. 28
SECTION 2Ia

If, for present purposes, it may be assumed that the same public
interest would be served if the representative of a corporate bankrupt
examined under section 7a were entitled to the same immunity as an
individual bankrupt thereunder, it logically follows that the immunity
of both, if it is to exist at all, should be identical under examinations
pursuant to section 2Ia. Yet, even this broad premise cannot easily define the privilege of the representative of a corporate bankrupt, since
there is some uncertainty as to the privilege of the individual bankrupt
himself in this area.
The language of section 7a(io) cannot be said unequivocally to
indicate whether or not the immunity clause was intended to extend to
section 2Ia examinations. Opinions on this question may, however, be
aligned as follows: Two dicta and one square holding"0 urge that the
immunity clause was intended to pertain only to examinations under sectend to incriminate him, then he should be denied the privilege of discharge."

H.R.

REP. No. 1409 on H.R. 8046, 7 5 th Cong., ist Sess. 25 (1937). This language could
be construed to imply that the immunity is accorded in other examinations in order to
save for the bankrupt the privilege of discharge.
2 This, admittedly, would be an extremely troublesome test to administer, for it is
difficult enough to perceive when this effect would ensue even when benefited by a
panoramic view of details of both the corporate and the individual bankruptcy proceedings. See In re Marcus, 149 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd without reference to this issue, 253 F.zd 685 (x958), noted in 43 IOWA L. REv. 406 (1958);
Raphiel v. Morris Plan Industrial Bank of New York, 146 F.2d 340 (x944); In re
Lesser, 234 Fed. 65 (zd Cir. 1916) ; Schieffelin & Co., Inc. v. Herold, 22z F.2d 262
(2d Cir. 1955) 5 1 COLLIER § 14.17; Krause, Denial of a Discharge to an Indieidual
Bankrupt Who Makes a False Statement on Behalf of a Corporation, 32 REF. J. III
(1958); Schwartz, Opposition to a Discharge by Reason of Acts or Conduct in Another Bankruptcy Proceeding, 2o REF. 3. 57 (1946); Oglebay, Some Developments
in Bankruptcy Law, 19 REF. J. 107, "1 (945).
22 Cajiafas v. United States, 38 F.2d
3 (6th Cir. 1930) ; Goldstein v. United States,

x F.2d 593 (sth Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 667 (1926).

"'United States v. Epstein, 152 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
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tion 7; two dicta3' suggest the contrary, a view in which most commentators concur.3 2
It is difficult to credit a congressional intent to distinguish in this
manner between section 7 and section 2ia examinations 3 for no satisfactory reason therefor readily appears. The two types of examination
are closely interrelated,3 4 overlap to a certain extent,35 and, indeed,
supplement each other in promoting fullest possible disclosure under
the Act. Although examinations under section 21a must be generally
limited in purpose to furthering administration of the estate,30 they may
be conducted at any time subsequent to the filing of the petition;3 7 even
after adjudication."
Indeed, as a matter of practice, the provisions of
section 2ia are usually employed for all examinations of the bankrupt
except those conducted at the first meeting of creditors and at the hearing on objections to his discharge." Moreover, it is only under section
2i 4 ° that officers and stockholders of a bankrupt corporation who ceased
to be such prior to filing of the petition may be examined. 41 Thus, it
appears that examinations under section 21a are equally as important to
3' United States v. Weissman,

219

F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1955)

(immunity can be

claimed by sole shareholder of bankrupt corporation examined under § 21a); In re
Alphin & Lake Cotton Co., 131 Fed. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1904) (implication that officers
of bankrupt corporation could claim the immunity whether examined under § 7 or
§ 2xa). It would seem logical to infer that a bankrupt can claim the immunity if a
representative of a bankrupt can.
23B.g., 2 COLLIER 21.15; 5 REMINGTON § 20085 Note, aS ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
259 (954).
In general, see Lipkin, Examinations under Section 2Ia of the Bankruptcy Act and Their Use in Subsequent Proceedings, 25 REF. J. 38 (1951).
"'United States v. Epstein, 152 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1957), carefully considers
the question but arrives at a conclusion which is hardly supported by some of the cases
cited therein. Compare id., at 586-88 and notes thereto, with 2 COLLIER 1 21.15 n. 2.
Moreover, the court, at 587 n. ii, purports to distinguish United States v. Weissman,
219 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1955), on the factual basis that in Epstein schedules had been
signed by the bankrupt after adjudication, while in Weissman the sole shareholder had
signed the schedules before adjudication. It appears, however, that in the Weissman
case Judge Learned Hand did not rely on the signing of schedules per se to invoke
the immunity, but rather noted in distinguishing In re Bush Terminal Co., 102 F.2d
471 (2d Cir. 1939), that the sole shareholder, having been directed by the court to
sign the schedules, was identified with the bankrupt by virtue of the provisions of § b.
7
5 REMINGTON § 2008.
See note 2 supra.
"See 2 COLLIER 21 07.
"Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710 (1914) ; see 5 REMINGTON § 1987.
See 2 COLLIER 21.07.
"See x CoLLIE. 17.7.
'o See note 15 supra.
' See 2 COLLIER 21.09.
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successful administration of a bankrupt estate as those conducted under.
42 and that only in conjunction do the two sections empower a
section 7a,"
43
court to secure full examinations of a bankrupt.
Therefore, it seems evident that the same policy that requires the
recognition of an immunity for testimony uttered at a first meeting of
creditors is, to a marked extent, frustrated when that immunity is denied
a bankrupt who appears for examination on some other occasion under
section 2ia. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the same legal
compulsion to appear and to testify exists in both cases. Moreover, the
bankrupt will lose his right to a discharge if he refuses to submit to a
section 2ia examination. 44 By the same token, then, if the representative of a corporate bankrupt can claim a testimonial immunity under section 7, identical to that of the bankrupt, when directed under section 7b
to submit to section 7a examination, he should be able to claim that same
immunity when subjected to a section 21 examination.45
"See

i. at

zx.o8.

See also United States v. Weissman, 2i9 F.zd 837 (2d Cir.
I3 Fed. 8z5 (E.D. Ark. 19o4).

1955); In re Alphin & Lake Cotton Co.,

"id. at 21.15.
" IbL.
,'"We can see no reason for denying to such a person the protection that is given to
the bankrupt, obviously for the purpose of insuring a full disclosure of the facts."
United States v. Weissman, 2i9 F.zd 837, 841 (zd Cir. 1955).

